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Response
Geneviève Piché
Dr. Nasr certainly has given us much to think about by covering a
wide range of issues relevant to the future of Islam. His discussion of
post-modernism and the challenge of the epoch is timely, particularly
considering the way technology is facilitating and encouraging the
flow of information, and thus increasing the traffic of modern science,
American entertainment, and materialism from the West to the Mus-
lim world. In order to spawn some debate, I have chosen to pose the
following question: how can one discuss the future of Islam without
seriously addressing the issue of religious fundamentalism? Underly-
ing this phenomenon are forces that are truly revealing about the gen-
eral structure of Islamic society and the sort of spasmodic behavior we
have been seeing from the Muslim world. Modernization certainly
underlies much of the current type of fundamentalism. Dr. Nasr’s
reflections are of immense value, but I find his inattention to funda-
mentalism a little surprising. Consequently, at this point, I would like
to further elaborate upon what I believe is the critical relationship
between Islam, religious fundamentalism, and modernization.
*****
Although the end of the Cold War and the dawn of the Information
Age have ushered in a new era of possibilities for a freer, more peace-
ful world, they have also thrown up new dangers to peace, stability,
and democracy. After forty-five years, the disappearance of the great
ideological divide and the end of the balance of terror are forcing gov-
ernments and nations to rethink their risky political, cultural, and eco-
nomic strategies, considering that the enemies of civil liberty and
development have drawn up their own plans for a new world order.
Turmoil in the Islamic world, from Central Asia and the Middle East to
North Africa and Southeastern Asia where the ominous specter of reli-
gious militancy looms, surely attests to this reality.1
As with all-powerful global changes in the course of history, the
breakdown of the old order has created a new environment, with new
rules and expectations. If political and cultural systems are to survive,
they must adapt effectively to the world’s incipient and dynamic
framework. This is essential.
56
Unfortunately, the problem is that this new framework is still in an
embryonic stage, and the amorphousness of this state of flux, inherent
in any period of transition, has transformed the final decade of the
twentieth century into a highly unpredictable and hazardous period.
Today, the Persian Gulf region and Central Asia can be described as
two of the world’s most volatile areas. The tremendous impact of the
Soviet Union’s collapse has been felt, first and foremost, within its suc-
cessor states, especially the Central Asian and Caucasian republics,
which acquired part of the old Soviet empire’s nuclear and conven-
tional arsenals. Iran, with its extensive geography and enormous
strategic and economic potential, is at the crossroads of the two trouble
spots. Oil, arms, and deeply ingrained nationalist, ethnic, historical,
and cultural hostilities, as well as profound religious and ideological
conflicts common to both the Middle Eastern countries and ex-Soviet
states of south-central Asia, have catapulted the entire region into
combustible circumstances. Furthermore, the question we must criti-
cally consider is how exactly can the deep tensions within Muslim
regions ever be appeased? In my opinion, the most important issue
that faces Islam is the difficult task of reconciling religion with gover-
nance in the context of a modern and evolving world.
The problem of governance in Islamic states brings forth the two
critical issues I wish to discuss: fundamentalism and modernization.
Not only are both concepts critical in discussing the future of Islam at
this point in time and establishing a stable relationship between Islam
and civil society, politics, and economics, but I will also show that they
are, in effect, very closely related.
*****
In the past two decades, an authentic cultural and religious revolution
has spread through most Muslim lands. It has at times been victorious,
as in Iran; sometimes defeated, as in Egypt; sometimes triggered civil
war, as in Algeria; and sometimes formally acknowledged by the state,
as in the Sudan and Bangladesh. Most times, however, it has created
an unsteady coexistence in a formally Islamic nation-state, fully inte-
grated into global capitalism, like Saudi Arabia and Indonesia. Overall,
this cultural revolution is determining the identity and political fate of
over a billion people around the world.
At this point, a brief definition of “fundamentalism” is in order. In
the late 1980s, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences undertook
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a major comparative project aimed at observing fundamentalism in
various social and institutional contexts. The study concluded that fun-
damentalism is always reactive and reactionary. I found a particularly
helpful definition of fundamentalism by Manuel Castells: “fundamen-
talism is the construction of collective identity under the identification
of individual behavior and society’s institutions to the norms derived
from God’s law, interpreted by a definite authority that intermediates
between God and humanity.”2
Although Islamic fundamentalism has existed in various forms for a
long time, it is not a traditionalist movement. Although efforts have
been made to root Islamic identity in history and the holy scriptures,
many Islamists have modernized their cultural identity for the sake of
social resistance and political insurgency. But if Islam is essentially
redefining itself as a contemporary identity, why now? Why has it
exploded in the past two decades, after being repeatedly overshad-
owed by nationalism in the post-colonial period, as exemplified by the
repression of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt and Syria, the rise of
Sukarno in Indonesia, and of the Front de Libération Nationale in Alge-
ria?3 It appears as though this new explosion of Islamic movements is
related to both the disruption of traditional societies and the failure of
the nationalist state to accomplish modernization, distribute the bene-
fits of economic growth among the population at large, and develop
the economy as a whole. Thus, Islamic militants appear to enter the
fray in opposition to capitalism, socialism, and nationalism (Arab or
otherwise), which are, in their view, all failing ideologies of the post-
colonial order.
A classic example of this phenomenon is Iran. In 1963, the Shah
launched the White Revolution, which proved to be an unprecedented
attempt to modernize the Iranian economy and society. He had strong
support from the United States and had the clear objective of tighten-
ing links with the global capitalist system. There is no doubt that this
undertaking undermined basic structures of traditional society, from
agriculture to the calendar. When Khomeini landed in Tehran to lead
the revolution in 1979, he opposed simultaneously the institution of
monarchy, the nation-state, and modernization “Western-style.” What
ensued was a radicalization of the Islamic regime which, after the
costly Iran-Iraq war, led to the drastic restructuring of society, and the
setting up of special religious judges to deal with impious acts such as
adultery, homosexuality, gambling, treason, and sympathy for athe-
ists. There followed waves of violence aimed at leftist critics and Marx-
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ist guerrillas. This is the story of fundamentalist logic in Iran, and
although it is an easy one to tell, other countries have had similar expe-
riences.
In his groundbreaking scholarly trilogy entitled The Information Age:
Economy, Society and Culture, Manuel Castells suggests that “the social
roots of radical fundamentalism appear to derive from the combina-
tion of successful state-led modernizations in the 1950s and 1960s and
the failure of economic modernization in most Muslim countries dur-
ing the 1970s and 1980s, as their economies could not adapt to the new
conditions of global competition and technological revolution in the
latter period.”4 Therefore, the young, urban population, with a high
level of education as a result of the first wave of modernization, was
frustrated in its expectations as the economy faltered and new forms of
cultural dependency settled in. It was joined in its discontent by
impoverished masses expelled from rural areas to cities by the unbal-
anced modernization of agriculture. This social mixture was made
explosive by the crisis of the nation-state, whose employees, including
military personnel, suffered declining living standards and lost faith in
the nationalist project. The crisis of legitimacy of the nation-state was
the result of its widespread corruption, inefficiency, and dependency
upon foreign powers. As a result, the construction of a contemporary
Islamic identity proceeds as a reaction against an alienating modern-
ization, be it capitalist or socialist, the negative consequences of global-
ization, and the collapse of the post-colonial project. This is why the
differential development of fundamentalism in the Muslim world
seems to be linked to the capacity of the nation-state to integrate into a
successful nationalist project both the urban masses, through economic
welfare, and the Muslim clergy, through official sanction of their reli-
gious power under the protection of the state. Thus, Indonesia, until
now, and Malaysia seem to be able to integrate Islamic pressures
within their authoritarian nation-states by creating fast economic
growth and providing glimpses of a promising future to their citizens.
On the other hand, Castells asserts, “the nationalist projects of Egypt,
Algeria, and Tunisia, some of the most Westernized Muslim countries,
collapsed in the 1980s, thus ushering in social tensions that were pre-
dominantly captured by Islamists under moderate, radical, and demo-
cratic radical versions.”5
In the 1990s, Islamism in politics and the new Islamic fundamental-
ist identity seem to be visible in a variety of different contexts and are-
nas—situations always related to the existence of social exclusion as a
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result of failed or ineffective modernization. Thus, the disaffected
youth, such as the Maghrebians in France, the Turks in Germany, and
even the African-Americans here in the United States, appear to be
redefining their Islamic identity as a result of social discrimination,
cultural abuse, and unemployment. Through a wide range of political
mechanisms, depending on the particular nation-state, and the global
network of each individual economy, an Islamic fundamentalist pro-
ject has emerged in most Muslim countries. Furthermore, it has even
appeared among the Muslim minorities of developed non-Muslim
societies.
*****
Now, I will briefly expound upon what I believe are the dangers of
fundamentalism, particularly of the highly dogmatic type. In critically
analyzing the history of Islam, experts have generally seen the Shi’ah
versus Sunni conflict as the main source of strife between Muslim com-
munities. This conflict has certainly continued at various times and to
various degrees, whether in the form of scholarly debates and canoni-
cal discussion or bloody confrontations. Too often overlooked, how-
ever, is the essential antagonism between opposing interpretations of
Islamic ideology and the message of revelation, tensions which have
persisted for fourteen centuries, since the founding of the Islamic com-
munity in the seventh century by Prophet Muhammad.
On one side is the dogmatic outlook, which is unwilling to accept
the essence of the Quran and the teachings of the Prophet of Islam —
mercy, liberty, and guidance of the individual and society toward
moral and material evolution. To the dogmatist, compassion, love,
freedom, and progress are not absolute values; the tendency is toward
brutality, vengeance, intolerance, ignorance, and superstition. These
qualities not only contradict the approach and practices of the
Prophet’s original teachings, but have been responsible for a wide
range of regressive actions in the Muslim world.
On the other hand, there have also been Muslims who have fol-
lowed Muhammad’s genuine message of mercy and liberty, rejecting
dogmatism and fanaticism. This ideological clash has never been lim-
ited to Shi’ites versus Sunnis. In fact, it has persisted to varying
degrees within many Islamic communities. Conflicting ideological
interpretations are common to all religions, but with Islam the issues
have immediate political overtones more volatile than theoretical dis-
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cussions or academic disputes. The conflicts may last for centuries
because Islam’s distinctive characteristic is a model of life, not just of
worship. Hence, differing interpretations of the teachings of Islam
directly and immediately translate into political conflicts. Thus, when
radical fundamentalists act up, repercussions are felt even at the state
level.
A close look at this linkage of politics and religious sentiments of
the Muslim masses is essential in understanding how religious dema-
gogues and fundamentalists have tried to usurp power, and why
Marxism, nationalism, and liberalism (especially in the anti-religious
form) have failed to serve as alternatives to the religious forces in the
Islamic world. Could it be, then, that the only viable alternative capa-
ble of countering dogmatic fundamentalism is a modern, democratic
Islam that opposes the union of church and state? Furthermore, can the
Islamic world ever be secular? Clearly, these are questions motivated
by my Western upbringing, and I am not a steadfast supporter of the
“Western” answers to these questions, but I do believe the questions
bring up critical aspects of the relationship between Islam and gover-
nance that must be carefully examined.
In sum, I believe that without confronting fundamentalism in politi-
cal and cultural terms, not much can be achieved. Furthermore,
addressing issues of social inequity, Westernization, and post-modern
thought will affect the nature of fundamentalism in Islam. I must now
say two things. First, I do not wish to suggest that incomplete modern-
ization and the nation-state crises are the only sources of fundamental-
ism. I fully realize the extent to which other cultural, social, and
historical factors contribute to it. Second, I have attempted to keep my
viewpoint about Islamic fundamentalism fairly neutral; that is, I don’t
claim it to be necessarily bad or good. Instead, implicit in my argument
is that some forms of fundamentalism can be positive and rejuvenating
while others can be destructive and repressive. I merely suggest that
fundamentalism must be aggressively addressed in any discussion
about the future of Islam.
*****
I conclude with a few short but more philosophical reflections on the
fate and future of Islam. We are discussing more than just a clash of
cultures, between Islam and the West; it is the conflict of two opposing
philosophies. Under the great complexity of the structures involved—
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the weavings of history, the mosaics of cultures — we can reduce the
conflict to a basic contradiction: the West is secular and materialist and
Islam is preponderantly faith-driven; one has marginalized belief
while the other has placed it at the center of its worldview. Therefore,
it is not just a clash between Islam and the West—it seems more foun-
dational than that.
On the verge of the twenty-first century, the violent and passionate
confrontation between Islam and the West poses internal predica-
ments for both. Muslims must struggle to preserve the essence of the
Quranic message in a meaningful, profound way. They must look for
ways to participate in the globalizing world without having their iden-
tities obliterated. This is truly a difficult test. One road will lead them
to harmony, hope, and vitality, while the other will lead to strife, petty
bickering, and disunity. The challenge for the Western world is to
understand how to expand the Western notions of justice, equality,
freedom, and liberty beyond their borders without appearing like
nineteenth-century imperialists. At the core of this global dilemma and
redefinition of identities lies one of the most important abilities of any
society, nation-state, civilization, or religion since the beginning of
time — adaptability. If Islam is unable to adapt to the growing pres-
sures of the Western world and the West remains deaf to the argu-
ments and viewpoints of Muslims, the world is destined to be a more
divided and dangerous place.
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